There are some aspects of this general managing gig Neal Huntington doesn’t do well.
As Alan Saunders wrote Wednesday, communication is an apparent weak spot. Hey, we all have at least one. Huntington’s just happens to be in an aspect that’s particularly troublesome in our media-saturated world. And as Alan nailed, ineffective messaging can cause internal organizational harm just as easily as public-relations trouble.
It used to be that a General Manager could let his actions do the talking. Not that Huntington’s actions have been epically great in recent years, but as “retooling” efforts go — his word, not mine — the past two years haven’t been disastrous from a ‘controllables’ standpoint.
Bear with me for a moment, as the following things have been said before, but there was plenty to the Pirates’ 2016-17 decline that I wouldn’t pin on management …
**Gerrit Cole fell from apparent ace-in-the-making to average major-league starter, when healthy.
**Andrew McCutchen fell from star-level production to something far less quicker than expected.
**Gregory Polanco and Francisco Cervelli couldn’t stay on the field and mostly underperformed when they did.
**Starling Marte went and spoiled what should have been a prime season with supplemental indiscretion.
**Jung Ho Kang … yeah, moving on.
In all candor, I expected more from every one of those players. I’m sure Huntington did, too, but preparing for the uncertainties of human performance are part of the GM gig, so he doesn’t get a complete pass for an inadequate backup plan.
Where Huntington does get leeway, at least in my eyes, is in managing the resources he has at his disposal.
For all the nonsense you hear to the contrary, devoting less than half of what the highest-spending teams put toward player payroll affects your chances to win Major League Baseball games. It feels like a waste of time to even flesh out that statement, so I won’t belabor the point much.
Yes, I realize the data indicates payroll disparity isn’t the end-all and be-all, but I don’t believe anyone genuine ever said it was. Because of the way the Pirates choose to do business, Huntington has less margin for error than all but a few of his brethren in the business.
If this feels like common sense, it’s because it is, but some commentators and fans like to lump Huntington and his baseball operations staff in with Bob Nutting and Frank Coonelly. That’s unfair and untrue.
For evidence, I point to the trades Huntington has made in which saving money wasn’t a determining factor. So, I’m not including about the sendoffs for Andrew McCutchen, Charlie Morton, or Francisco Liriano, even though those moves had some asset management motivations as well.
Thursday’s acquisition of Corey Dickerson looks promising, but getting rid of the underperforming Daniel Hudson was worthwhile in and of itself. Beyond the specifics, it reminded me that, when not chiefly motivated by the desire to dump a contract, Huntington isn’t too shabby at getting major-league value in deals.
The problem is that, with the way the Pirates operate, Huntington has had relatively few trades that were primarily pushed by baseball-related decisions. Dickerson qualifies as one of those, even if Rays GM Erik Neander was playing the role usually manned by Huntington. Take my player, please!
Funny enough, one of the biggest coups for Huntington in his decade-plus in charge was another situation in which another team was eager to drop a contract: A.J. Burnett and cash from the Yankees for Diego Moreno and Exicardo Cayones. The trade acquisition of Felipe Rivero and Taylor Hearn for two months of Mark Melancon will have a hard time topping Burnett’s arrival, considering the stability Burnett provided the rotation for two seasons, and eventually a third.
Then there were the trades made to augment a contending big-league club at midseason. Derrek Lee, Wandy Rodríguez, Travis Snider, Marlon Byrd, Joe Blanton, Joakim Soria, and J.A. Happ each added value for minimal giveback. Not all of those trades were a hit — hello, Justin Morneau and Aramis Ramírez — but I’d give Huntington a solid grade when he’s been in ‘buy’ mode.
A retort to this argument might be: A General Manager should do well in trades when he’s not over a barrel and desperate to recoup any value.
That’s fair, and let’s not forget the awful Neil Walker deal two winters ago, when Huntington was even (at least) in terms of leverage during negotiations with the Mets. Plus, if we want to go way back, Huntington got little of worth from Jason Bay, stalling the much-needed rebuild right from the start.
So there you have it, a General Manager that’s not great, but certainly isn’t inept when executing a critical part of his job. The problem is that being average to good might not be enough to overcome the obstacles in the Pirates’ way, both external and of their own creation.
I’ve tried to keep all this in mind when evaluating Huntington’s performance during the team’s downturn. It’s not fair to expect him to be the GM equivalent of a .400 hitter, even though he might need to be to produce the level of success Pittsburghers are used to seeing from the two other major-league organizations in town. And as I was saying before, the Dickerson deal is a good reminder that Huntington is probably better at this gig than he gets the chance to put on display.
The problem from an analysis standpoint? We can never truly know where Huntington’s own shortcomings end and where his bosses’ budget limitations begin. At least we’ll have some games to discuss soon.
